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ABSTRACT 
Background Infection with the newly emerged highly pathogenic avian influenza 
A(H5N6) virus has caused reported 17 laboratory-confirmed human cases in China to 
date. The epidemiologic characteristics of confirmed A(H5N6) cases were compared 
to A(H5N1) and A(H7N9) cases in mainland China. 
Methods Data on laboratory-confirmed H5N6, H5N1 and H7N9 cases identified in 
mainland China were analysed to compare epidemiologic characteristics and clinical 
severity of the cases. Severity of the confirmed H5N6, H5N1 and H7N9 cases was 
estimated based on the risk of severe outcomes in hospitalized cases. 
Findings Reported influenza H5N6 cases were older than H5N1 cases with a higher 
prevalence of underlying medical conditions but younger than H7N9 cases. 
Epidemiological time-to-event distributions were similar among cases infected with 
the three viruses. In comparison to a fatality risk of 70% (30/43) for hospitalized 
H5N1 cases and 41% (319/782) for hospitalized H7N9 cases, 12 (75%) out of the 16 
hospitalized H5N6 cases were fatal, and 15 (94%) required mechanical ventilation. 
Interpretation Similar epidemiologic characteristics and severity were observed in 
cases of H5N6 and H5N1 virus infection, while severity of H7N9 virus infections 
appeared lower. Continued surveillance of human infections with avian influenza A 
viruses remains an essential component of pandemic influenza preparedness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of a novel avian influenza A virus that causes severe disease in 
humans poses a pandemic risk that deserves close attention. Highly pathogenic avian 
influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus emerged to cause 18 human infections in Hong 
Kong including 6 deaths in 1997, drawing global attention.1 HPAI H5N1 virus has 
continued to circulate and evolve among poultry and wild birds beyond Asia to other 
regions including the Middle East, with more than 850 human infections reported 
from 16 countries since 2003, and a cumulative case fatality proportion of >50%. 2-4 
Genetically related, but distinct subtypes of the recently emerged genetic clade 2.3.4.4 
of  HPAI H5 viruses, including H5N2, H5N3, H5N6 and H5N8, have been detected 
in wild birds and poultry in a number of countries,  posing an unknown threat to 
human public health.5 Other non H5 subtypes of avian influenza A viruses have 
caused sporadic human infections worldwide.6  
 
In the spring of 2013, low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) A(H7N9) virus emerged 
to cause 130 laboratory-confirmed cases of human infection in China.7 Seasonal 
waves of H7N9 human infections have occurred each subsequent winter in China, 
with 805 cumulative cases reported globally including sporadic cases exported from 
mainland China to other territories and approximately 40% case fatality proportion 
reported as of 30 November 2016.8  
 
In May 2014, the first human case of laboratory-confirmed HPAI A(H5N6) virus 
infection was reported in Sichuan province, China.9 As of 30 November 2016 there 
have been a cumulative total of 17 confirmed cases, 12 of which were reported in 
2016. Here, we assessed the epidemiologic characteristics of laboratory-confirmed 
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human cases of HPAI A(H5N6) virus infection in mainland China, compared to 
confirmed cases of HPAI A(H5N1) and LPAI A(H7N9) virus infections in mainland 
China.  
 
METHODS 
Sources of data 
In China, all laboratory-confirmed cases of human infection with H7N9 and H5N1 
viruses are reported to the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (China 
CDC) through a national system. Information on cases of human infection with H5N6 
virus were obtained through field epidemiological investigations and literature review. 
We used standard forms to collect demographic, epidemiological, and basic clinical 
data for patients with confirmed cases of H5N6, H7N9 or H5N1 virus infections. We 
collected detailed epidemiological information on laboratory-confirmed H5N6, H7N9 
and H5N1 cases reported as of 30 November 2016. In the current analysis, we used 
data on age, sex, place of residence, symptoms at illness onset, and underlying 
medical disorders associated with an increased risk of seasonal influenza 
complications; dates of illness onset, hospital admission, death or discharge; and dates 
of potential exposures to domestic or retail animals, visits to live poultry markets; and 
clinical presentation, diagnosis and treatment. Recent exposure history to poultry 
including at live poultry markets and to backyard poultry during the ten days prior to 
illness onset were recorded through an interview with the patient or the relative of a 
patient.10 
 
 6 
Ethical approval 
Collection and analyses of data from human cases of H5N6, H7N9 and H5N1 were 
part of an ongoing public health investigation of emerging outbreaks and thus were 
exempt from institutional review board assessment in China.10  
 
Statistical analysis 
We performed descriptive analyses of confirmed cases of H5N6 in comparison to 
H5N1 and H7N9 cases, using t-tests and chi-squared tests to compare continuous 
variables and categorical variables respectively. We plotted the geographical location 
of H5N6 and H5N1 cases, in comparison to the incidence rates of H7N9 virus 
infections estimated at a provincial level rather than plotted individually, given the 
large number of reported H7N9 cases relative to H5N1 or H5N6 cases in China. We 
fitted parametric distributions to the time from illness onset to hospital admission, 
illness onset to laboratory confirmation, hospital admission to death, and hospital 
admission to discharge.10-12 We compared alternative parametric distributions, 
including gamma, Weibull, and lognormal distributions, with non-parametric 
estimates, and selected the best parametric distribution on the basis of the Akaike 
information criterion.13   
 
We compared the severity of H5N6, H5N1 and H7N9 cases based on the risk of 
severe outcomes in hospitalized cases, given that there is likely considerable under-
ascertainment of mild, non-hospitalized cases.14,15 Specifically, mild cases have been 
detected through the national influenza-like illness sentinel surveillance network 
which covers around 1% of outpatient consultations and only performs laboratory 
testing on a small fraction of influenza-like illness patients identified in the network.16 
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Among hospitalized cases, we estimated the risk of admission to intensive care unit, 
the risk of requiring mechanical ventilation, and the risk of death, and compared these 
risks between H5N6, H5N1, and H7N9 cases. 
 
Role of the funding source 
The funding bodies had no role in study design, data collection, data analysis, data 
interpretation, or writing of the manuscript. The corresponding author had full access 
to all the data in the study, and had final responsibility for the decision to submit for 
publication. 
 
RESULTS 
As of 30 November 2016, there were 17 laboratory-confirmed human cases of H5N6, 
compared to 45 H5N1 cases and 782 H7N9 cases reported in mainland China. H5N6 
cases were significantly older and had a higher prevalence of underlying medical 
conditions than H5N1 cases, but were significantly younger than H7N9 cases (Table 
1). The sex distributions of H5N6 and H5N1 cases were similar with a largely even 
involvement of female and male patients, while H7N9 infections were more 
frequently reported in males. There was no difference between the prevalence of 
underlying medical conditions for H5N6 compared to H7N9 cases. All of the H5N6 
cases reported recent exposure to poultry, with a greater (not statistically significant) 
frequency of recent visits to live poultry markets than for H5N1 or H7N9 cases. 
(Table 1). 
 
Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of H5N6, H5N1 and H7N9 cases. The 
H5N6 cases have been identified in south and southwest China, while the H5N1 cases 
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have occurred more sporadically across a broader part of the country. As previously 
noted, the incidence rate of H7N9 cases has been higher in eastern and southern 
China, where the density of live poultry markets is also highest.17 
 
The time from symptom onset to hospital admission and the time from onset to 
laboratory confirmation was similar for cases infected with H5N6, H5N1 and H7N9 
viruses (Figure 2A and 2B). A wide range of delays from hospital admission to death 
was observed in confirmed infections with the three viruses (Figure 2C). Among 
those survived, the hospital stay was mostly longer than two to three weeks whereas 
scarce recovery data were available for H5N6 (Figure 2D). Around 88% of H5N6 
patients and 73% of H7N9 cases received antiviral treatment, which were higher than 
H5N1 cases (58%). The time from illness onset to initiation of antiviral treatment was 
shorter for H5N6 cases (5 days, median) compared to H7N9 (6 days) and H5N1 cases 
(7 days) (Figure 3). Six out of twelve H5N6-related deaths occurred within five days 
after hospital admission, and most H5N1 and H7N9 related deaths also had a 
relatively short duration of hospital stay. Of the 16 hospitalized H5N6 cases, 15 
(94%) required mechanical ventilation, twelve cases were fatal, and three patients 
recovered while the outcome of one previously hospitalized patient is unknown. This 
compares to a fatality risk of 70% (30/43) for hospitalized H5N1 cases, and 41% 
(319/782) for hospitalized H7N9 cases that were confirmed between March 2013 and 
November 2016.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Human infections with HPAI H5N6 virus are the latest in a series of reported cases of 
human infections with avian influenza A viruses in China, following HPAI H5N1 
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virus infections since 2003,10,18 LPAI H7N9 virus infections since 2013,10,11,19,20 
H10N8 virus infection in 2013.21 and LPAI H9N2 virus infections since 1998.22 
These continued zoonotic events pose a major threat to public health since an avian 
influenza A virus may be able to acquire mutations that allow for efficient and 
sustained human-to-human transmission and lead to the next influenza pandemic.23 
Avian influenza A viruses including HPAI H5N6 have been detected in free-range 
poultry and wild birds24 and more frequently in live poultry markets.24,25 The newly 
emerged HPAI H5N6 virus belonging to the genetic clade 2.3.4.4 of H5 virus 
subtypes has acquired receptor binding affinity to the human-like SAα2,6Gal-linked 
receptor, suggesting increased pandemic potential, although HPAI H5N6 virus did not 
exhibit aerosol transmission and demonstrated relatively lower pathogenicity 
compared with HPAI H5N1 virus in the ferret model.26  
 
The sporadic occurrence of human H5N6 cases across southern China is somewhat 
consistent with the areas of highest poultry density,17 although poultry density is also 
high in eastern China around the Yangtze River delta where H5N6 cases have not yet 
been reported in the current outbreak. Human exposure to live poultry in China is also 
high in cities in southern China,27 where there is also a high density of live poultry 
markets.17 Fourteen of the H5N6 cases reported recent exposure to live poultry 
markets (Table 1). However, there were distinct differences in the characteristics of 
H5N6 cases compared to H5N1 and H7N9 cases, with H5N6 cases having a mean age 
somewhat between the younger (on average) H5N1 cases and older (on average) 
H7N9 cases (Table 1). The majority of H5N6 cases had underlying medical 
conditions, which was not observed for H5N1 cases (Table 1). 
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In terms of the severity of hospitalized cases, 94% of H5N6 cases were admitted into 
an intensive care unit and required mechanical ventilation, similar to hospitalized 
H5N1 and H7N9 cases. To date 12 of the 17 H5N6 cases have been fatal (71%), 
similar to the fatality risk of H7N9 cases identified early in 201311 and the fatality risk 
of hospitalized H5N1 cases in mainland China over the past 13 years (70%).10 There 
was a high risk of mortality despite use of oseltamivir in most cases, although often 
oseltamivir treatment was not given until >5 days after illness onset. 
 
One of the 17 H5N6 cases was detected through the influenza-like illness sentinel 
surveillance network28 that covers a small fraction of ambulatory medical 
consultations in China, suggesting that other cases of mild illness with H5N6 virus 
infection have likely occurred. Therefore, the number of confirmed human H5N6 
cases is likely to be an underestimate of all human H5N6 virus infections that have 
occurred, similar to the situation for H7N9 virus in China.14 China CDC established 
systematic surveillance for pneumonia of unknown etiology in 2004,29 and there have 
been improvements in laboratory surveillance for influenza, particularly since 2009. 
Given the increasing frequency with which human infections with avian influenza A 
viruses have been detected in recent years,10,11,18-21,30 it is important to determine 
whether this pattern is purely an artefact of improvements in surveillance, or a truly 
increasing risk of zoonotic events in addition to improved surveillance in China.  
 
Vaccination of poultry against H5N1 was introduced in China in 2006,31 which was 
also the year in which the incidence of human H5N1 cases peaked in China.10 
However, although H5N1 vaccination of domestic poultry protects against disease 
associated with H5N1 virus infection, it does not appear to protect against infection 
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and virus shedding in the absence of obvious symptoms.32 Recent experimental H5N1 
vaccine using the HA and NA genes from the 2.3.4.4 genetic clade showed complete 
protection against virus shedding and disease among chickens challenged with the 
H5N6 virus that has been causing outbreaks worldwide.33 This suggests that use of an 
H5N1 vaccine in poultry could also protect against infection with some strains of 
genetically related H5 subtypes, including H5N6 viruses, thereby reducing the risk of 
zoonotic transmission.  
 
There are some limitations of our study. First, our analysis of the epidemiology of 
H5N6 cases is based on case notifications, and it is possible that some human 
infections have occurred that were not laboratory-confirmed, for example because of 
a lack of clinical suspicion or access to laboratory testing in some areas.10 Second, 
only a small number of H5N6 cases have been reported to date, limiting our ability to 
characterize the differences with other avian influenza A virus infections or the 
typical illness course with H5N6 virus infection. 
 
In conclusion, we have described the epidemiology of the first 17 laboratory-
confirmed human infections with HPAI A(H5N6) virus in China. The laboratory-
confirmed H5N6 cases were characterized by severe illness among the 16 hospitalized 
cases, with a high risk of fatal outcome. It remains to be seen whether HPAI H5N6 
virus will continue to circulate among poultry and cause sporadic human infections in 
coming years, as H7N9 virus has done for 4 years now. Continued surveillance of 
human infections with avian influenza A viruses remains an essential component of 
pandemic preparedness, and further investigations may be needed on the driving 
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factors contributing to the the observed patterns of human infections with avian 
influenza A viruses. 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 
Figure 1. Geographic distributions of laboratory-confirmed infections with highly 
pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N6) virus (red triangles), and highly pathogenic 
avian influenza A(H5N1) virus (blue dots), in comparison with the incidence of 
laboratory-confirmed cases of low pathogenic avian influenza A(H7N9) virus 
infections in each province detected in mainland China. 
 
Figure 2. Time to event distributions of laboratory-confirmed infections with highly 
pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N6) (solid lines), low pathogenic avian influenza 
A(H7N9) (dotted lines), and highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) (dashed 
lines) viruses in mainland China. The curves are constructed as smoothed versions of 
the histograms from the raw data. 
Panel A: Days from illness onset to hospital admission. 
Panel B: Days from illness onset to laboratory confirmation of infection. 
Panel C: Days from hospital admission to death, with circles used to indicate the 
delays from admission to death for 12 cases of H5N6. 
Panel D: Days from hospital admission to discharge for recovered cases, with a circle 
used to indicate the delay from admission to death for H5N6 cases. 
 
Figure 3. Days from illness onset to the initiation of antiviral treatment for laboratory-
confirmed infections with highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N6) (solid lines), 
low pathogenic avian influenza A(H7N9) (dotted lines), and highly pathogenic avian 
influenza A(H5N1) (dashed lines) viruses in mainland China. The curves are 
constructed as smoothed versions of the histograms from the raw data.
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Table 1. Comparison of characteristics of laboratory-confirmed human infections with avian influenza A(H5N6), A(H5N1) and A(H7N9) 
viruses detected in mainland China. 
 H5N6 
(n=17) 
H5N1 
(n=45) 
p-value 
(H5N6 vs H5N1) 
H7N9 
(n=782) 
p-value 
(H5N6 vs H7N9) 
Median age, years (IQR) 40 (30, 47) 26 (20, 35) 
0.008 
58 (43, 68) <0.001 
Male 7/17 (41%) 23/45 (51%) 0.58 547/782 (70%) 
0.016 
Urban residence 10/17 (59%) 19/43 (44%) 039 476/782 (61%) 1.00 
Underlying medical conditions* 8/13 (62%) 5/41 (12%) 
0.001 444/711 (62%) 
1.00 
Poultry exposure (ten days before illness onset) 
  Any exposure to poultry 17/17 (100%) 30/42 (71%) 
0.013 
591/705 (84%) 
0.09 
  Occupational exposure to live poultry 0/9 (0%) 4/45 (9%) 
1.00 
63/782 (8%) 100 
  Visited live poultry market 12/17 (71%) 23/41 (56%) 0.38 
422/691 (61%) 
0.62 
  Exposure to sick or dead poultry 5/15 (33%) 16/41 (39%) 
0.76 
29/698 (4%) <0.001 
  Exposure to backyard poultry 7/16 (44%) 21/41 (51%) 
0.77 
161/632 (25%) 
0.14 
* Underlying medical conditions include chronic respiratory disease, asthma, chronic cardiovascular disease, diabetes, chronic liver disease, chronic kidney disease, 
immunosuppressed status, and neuromuscular disorders, which are considered to be associated with higher risk of severe illness from seasonal influenza. 
 
 
 
